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T
he financial crisis having entered its fifth
year, we look back on turbulent times of
severe economic and financial distress. To pre-
vent such crises in the future, a profound
overhaul of institutional frameworks, attitudes
and strategies is necessary.
Central banks, as well, need to reflect upon
their role. They played a crucial part in con-
taining the crisis, often having to act in a rather
flexible way and take unconventional meas-
ures. Although this flexibility was necessary
during the crisis, it must not become the para-
digm for the new framework within which
central banks operate during normal times.
This applies in particular to the relation of
monetary policy towards financial stability and
fiscal policy.
Prior to the crisis, central banks pursued a poli  -
cy of benign neglect with regard to financial
imbalances. The tools of monetary policy were
not applied to prevent such imbalances, but
rather to ease the pain after they triggered a
crisis. However, the recent crisis demonstrated
that the costs associated with this approach
can be very high. This insight has changed the
attitude towards the role of central banks, yet
it does not imply that monetary policy should
be used to correct financial imbalances direct-
ly. The arguments against such an approach
are still valid: the instruments of monetary
policy are too blunt to effectively secure finan-
cial stability, and there would always be the
danger of conflicts of interest. Thus, monetary
policy should stick to maintaining price stabil-
ity as its primary objective. Ensuring financial
stability should be the objective of a separate
policy domain, called macroprudential policy,
which is equipped with an independent set of
instruments. Actions taken in the two policy
domains might in some cases reinforce each
other; in other cases, however, conflicts of
interest might arise. Here, further research –
theoretical as well as empirical – is necessary
to minimise frictions.
While it is advisable to separate monetary poli  -
cy and macroprudential policy, it is even more
important for monetary policy to steer clear of
fiscal policy. Blurring the boundary between
the responsibilities of monetary policy on the
one hand and those of fiscal policy on the
other runs the risk that the monetary policy
mandate of safeguarding price stability and the
hardwon credibility of central banks will suf-
fer. Specifically, monetary policy and central
banks’ balance sheets must not be used to shift
or disguise burdens and risks that are ulti-
mately borne by the taxpayer. Thus, wherever
the boundary between monetary policy and
fiscal policy may have been blurred due to
exceptional circumstances, it has to be
redrawn as quickly as possible. Even though
the crisis surely warrants an overhaul of pre-
crisis convictions, certain principles are better
left unquestioned. Price stability as the pri-
mary objective of monetary policy and its
implementation by independent central banks
is definitely one of them.
CENTRAL BANKS AND MONETARY POLICY 
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OPTIMAL HOUSING, CONSUMPTION, AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS
OVER THE LIFE CYCLE
T
his paper derives explicit solutions to
life-cycle utility maximization prob-
lems involving stock and bond investment,
perishable consumption, and the rental
and ownership of residential real estate.
Over the life cycle, desired housing invest-
ment increases and eventually exceeds
desired consumption, suggesting that the
individual should buy his/her home. At
the end of the life cycle, preferences shift
back to home rental. We find that markets
for real estate investment trusts (REITs) or
other house pricelinked contracts can pro-
vide non-negligible welfare gains.
In his classical portfolio theory, Markowitz con-
siders a one-period model and studies the opti-
mal allocation of capital among different assets
or asset classes. This leads to myopic decisions,
which means that life-cycle effects are disre-
garded. For instance, questions such as
whether young people should invest more in
stocks than older people cannot be addressed.
In contrast, we must make decisions not only
for the next month or the upcoming year, but
also for our retirement or for the future educa-
tion of our children. John Campbell empha-
sized in his Presidential Address to the
American Finance Association on January 7,
2006, that “[…] the largest component of
wealth for most households is human capital,
which is non-tradable”. Due to the static fea-
tures of classical portfolio theory, labor income
cannot be incorporated in a realistic way. In
particular, life-cycle patterns cannot be mod-
eled using a simple mean-variance approach.
This calls for a dynamic setting that overcomes
the shortcomings of a one-period model.
Furthermore, common sense tells us that, apart
from human wealth, there is one additional
asset that should not be disregarded: residential
real estate. If people hold any assets at all, then
it is usually residential property (not stocks or
bonds) that plays a predominant role. Finally,
over time horizons of 50 years, it is unrealistic
to assume that interest rates are constant.
Consequently, the term structure must be
modeled by a dynamic model, adding an addi-
tional layer of complexity. To summarize, we
face a challenging decision problem that
involves several asset classes (stocks, bonds,
money market accounts and real estate) and
individual preferences regarding the consump-
tion of perishable goods and housing.
EXISTING WORK
Several recent papers include both labor
income and housing in life-cycle decision prob-
lems, but link the housing investment position
tightly to the housing consumption which has
repercussions for investment in other risky
assets. For instance, Campbell and Cocco
(2003) do not allow for housing investment
and consumption to differ and fix the house
size, so they cannot address the interaction
between portfolio and housing decisions.
Cocco (2005) assumes that house prices and
aggregate income shocks are perfectly correlat-
ed. Housing consumption and investment can-
not be disentangled, as renting is impossible
and no house price-linked assets are traded.
The individual can only enjoy housing con-
sumption by buying a house. Yao and Zhang
(2005) allow for an imperfect income-house
correlation and a renting/owning decision.
However, if the individual rents a house of a
given size, this will equal his/her housing con-
sumption and he will have zero wealth expo-
sure to house price risk. If the individual owns
a house, the size of the house determines hous-
ing consumption and is identical to the housing
Claus Munk  
Aarhus University
Holger Kraft 
Goethe Universityinvestment position. Most papers solve con-
sumption/portfolio problems by using numeri-
cal methods that are highly time-consuming
and cumbersome, and little is known about the
precision of the numerical results.
RENT FIRST, BUY LATER
We derive an explicit solution for a consump-
tion/portfolio problem with stocks, bonds,
money market account, housing and labor
income. This closed-form solution leads to a
deeper understanding of the economic forces
driving individual decisions in such a complex
setting. A calibrated version of our model gen-
erates life-cycle patterns with interesting and
realistic properties. The investment strategy can
be decomposed into speculative demands,
hedging demands, and so-called income-adjust-
ment terms. The desired risk exposure of the
financial wealth depends on the size and risk
characteristics of human wealth – the net pres-
ent value of future income – and the demand
for risky assets is adjusted accordingly in order
to obtain the desired overall risk exposure.
For a young individual, human wealth is high
and the individual thus invests less in assets
that are highly correlated with income and
more in assets with a low or negative correla-
tion. Stocks and bonds usually show little cor-
relation with income, whilst house prices have
a significant positive correlation. Therefore,
young individuals should have little or even
negative exposure to house price risk and are
inclined to rent rather than own the home
they live in. Later in life, when human wealth
and thus the negative adjustment of housing
investment are lower, desired housing invest-
ment increases and eventually exceeds desired
housing consumption, suggesting that the
individual should buy his/her home and
maybe even obtain a higher exposure to house
prices by buying additional housing units and
renting these out or by taking long positions in
house price-linked financial assets. In the final
years of life, desired housing investment again
falls below desired consumption, indicating a
shift back to home rental. Typical life-cycle
patterns are depicted in Panels A-D.
REFERENCES
Campbell, J. Y., Cocco J. F. (2003)
“Household Risk Management and Optimal
Mortgage Choice”,
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118,
Issue 4, pp. 1449-1494 
Cocco, J. F. (2005)
“Portfolio Choice in the Presence of Housing”,
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 18, Issue 2,
pp. 535-567 
Yao, R., Zhang, H. H. (2005)
“Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Choices with
Risky Housing and Borrowing Constraints”,
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 18, Issue 1,
pp. 197-239
The full article is available at: 
http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/reprint/
57/6/1025
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Panel A: Expected consumption
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Panel B: Expected wealth
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Panel D: Housing consumption and investment
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Panel C: Expected investments
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he last two decades have been char-
acterized by an extraordinary wave
of financial globalization. For many
industrialized countries, this has often
been accompanied by persistent current
account imbalances. Over-borrowing has
come along with booms in house prices,
mortgages and consumer credits and in
the demand for durable goods, such as
residential properties. Since a significant
proportion of claims on consumer credit
have been placed in the international
markets, for many countries, the boom in
the demand for durable goods has been
financed mainly through foreign lending. 
Indeed, Figure 1 shows the impressive growth
of foreign-denominated liabilities that occurred
at the end of the 2000s for a set of industrial-
ized countries (see also Lane/Milesi-Ferretti
2001 for a documentation of trends in foreign
liabilities). While access to international finan-
cial markets was considered as a chance to
improve risk sharing possibilities, de facto loose
lending standards produced over-borrowing
and financial instability. Private borrowing has
been generally tied to collateral values, in a
way that swings (upward or downward) in
durable prices (particularly house prices) have
determined the amount of lending. Bubbles in
house prices have fueled over-borrowing,
which in turn has fed back into an excessively
volatile and persistent current account deficit. 
WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL 
GLOBALIZATION
Recent research by Ester Faia (Faia 2011) ration-
alizes the evidence that in several countries the
increase in international capital flows has
increased consumption volatility, even relative
to output. Faia’s paper uses a small open econo-
my model in which foreign borrowing is mod-
eled through a collateral constraint. Collateral
takes the form of durable investment, which also
produces utility services. The presence of finan-
cial frictions implies that an increase in foreign
borrowing reduces the possibility of consump-
tion smoothing, thereby increasing consumption
volatility. In the presence of risk-averse house-
FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND MONETARY POLICY
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Ester Faia 
Goethe University
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Paris School of Economics
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Figure 1: International debt securities cover all foreign currency issues by residents and non-residents in a given market,
including in the borrower’s own currency, and foreign bonds (domestic currency bonds issued by non-residents 
in a given market). Source: Joint External Debt Hub database (JEDH).
0
1996 Q4           2000 Q4           2007 Q4holds, the increase in consumption volatility
translates into a reduction of welfare.
OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY
The effects described above introduce aggre-
gate distortions in the economy that motivate
a policy intervention. In another paper
(Faia/Iliopulos 2011), a small open economy
model with sticky prices and collateral con-
straints on foreign borrowing is used to ana-
lyze optimal monetary policy. The presence of
a collateral constraint introduces both static
and intertemporal wedges on consumption.
Since borrowing is valued in foreign currency,
while collateral, in the form of durables, is val-
ued in domestic currency, swings in the nom-
inal exchange rate affect fluctuations in both
the service costs and future values of debt.
Such fluctuations, in turn, amplify fluctua-
tions in the distorting wedges. The paper has
three main results. First, it shows that net asset
accumulation in this model is uniquely deter-
mined in the steady state and that it is saddle-
path stationary in a neighborhood of the
steady state. A crucial assumption for this
result is that foreign agents have higher dis-
count rates than domestic lenders. In this case,
the domestic economy experiences a persist-
ent current account deficit, as in equilibrium
domestic residents behave as impatient agents
and borrow from the rest of the world. Despite
this, the current account deficit leads to sta-
tionary dynamics. Second, a comparison of
alternative exchange rate regimes (floating
versus managed exchange rates) under pro-
ductivity, government expenditure and global
liquidity shocks and for alternative degrees of
financial openness shows that, under high
financial liberalization, fluctuations in the
exchange rates induce swings in the value of
collateral, thereby affecting the availability of
foreign lending. As a result, fluctuations in
consumption, output and CPI appear ampli-
fied under a scenario with high financial liber-
alization. Figure 2 shows changes in the
volatility of consumption, as generated by the
model, with respect to changes in the degree
of financial liberalization and also the response
of monetary policy to exchange rates. It stands
clear that while financial liberalization renders
consumption more volatile, responding to the
exchange rate has a stabilizing effect.
In this case, the monetary authority can stabi-
lize the economy by responding to the
exchange rates. This result reverses the logic of
the impossible trinity, so that increasing finan-
cial integration reduces the ability of monetary
policy to stabilize the domestic economy pre-
cisely under floating exchange rates. Finally,
the paper performs an analysis of optimal pol-
icy by deriving the Ramsey allocation. Optimal
monetary policy must stabilize and smooth
inefficient wedges. These goals call for stabi-
lization of nominal exchange rates over and
above domestic inflation. This result is in con-
trast with the prescriptions given so far under
the New Open Economy literature, namely
the optimality of an inward-looking strategy of
domestic inflation stabilization. Additionally, it
challenges the view prevailing so far in policy
making circles that monetary policy should
only target domestic inflation, with no weight
being assigned to nominal exchange rates and
other asset prices.
REFERENCES
Faia, E., Iliopulos, E. (2011)
“Financial Openness, Financial Frictions and
Optimal Monetary Policy”,
forthcoming in Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 
Faia, E. (2011)
“Macroeconomic and Welfare Implications of
Financial Globalization”,
Journal of Applied Economics, Vol. 14, 
pp. 119-144 
Lane, P., Milesi-Ferretti, G. (2001)
“The External Wealth of Nations: Estimates of
Foreign Assets and Liabilities for Industrial and
Developing Countries”,
Journal of International Economics, Vol. 55,
pp. 263-294
The full articles are available at: 
http://www.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/profs/faia/
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Figure 2: The volatility of consumption with respect to financial liberalization and the response of monetary policy to 
exchange rates
Degree of financial globalization Exchange rate target in monetary policy rule8
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T
he annual general meeting (AGM) is a
crucial element of corporate gover-
nance in public corporations and provides
the most important forum for sharehold-
er participation. A majority vote at an
AGM enables the shareholders to elect the
board and thus to control the company.
The reference value for this majority is
not the whole share capital but only the
voting capital represented at the AGM.
Thus, attendance becomes a crucial issue
not only for investors but also for the legal
definition of control over the company.
In order to examine the validity of existing
definitions in company as well as takeover law
we analyzed the voting turnouts of AGMs of
almost 500 public companies in 15 European
Union Member States for the period between
2006 and 2011. We considered whether share-
holder attendance is comparable in the differ-
ent countries, whether there were changes
over the period from 2006 till 2011 and what
might be the reasons for differences.
The data show considerable differences in 
voting turnouts between countries such as
Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom as
compared to Germany, Greece and Italy. While
the average AGM attendance in the three for-
mer countries ranges between 68 and 71 per
cent, on average, only between 54 and 60 per
cent of shareholders entitled to vote attended
the AGMs of public corporations in the latter
three countries. Thus, while on average a vot-
ing stake of 27 per cent is sufficient in order to
dominate a public company in Greece, the same
level of control over a UK plc requires a voting
stake of 35 per cent. However, both jurisdic-
tions set the threshold for takeovers at 30 per
cent of all shareholder votes, i.e. at a level that
would seem appropriate for the average Greek
company but not for the average UK plc.
DIFFERENT VOTING BEHAVIOR
Two explanations for differences in sharehold-
er attendance are proposed. First, a concentra-
tion of ownership leads to an increase in over-
all voting turnout and a concomitant decrease
in attendance by small shareholders whose
influence on corporate decision making is
diminished. This hypothesis is based on the
theory of transaction costs. While exercising
governance rights may lead to an increased
firm value and hence benefit shareholders, the
possible profit for small shareholders does not
outweigh the costs of attending the AGM and
of gathering and assessing the information
required to make an informed voting decision.
Large blockholders, on the other hand, have a
sufficient incentive to attend AGMs and to
exercise their voting rights. Using data from
different countries, van der Elst (2011) pro-
vides empirical support for this hypothesis. It
could explain differences in voting turnouts if
AGM attendance patterns correspond to dif-
ferent degrees of ownership concentration in
various Member States.
Second, the legal environment could influence
the incentive to take part in the AGM.
Shareholder power in the general meeting
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The
benefits of participating in an AGM increase
with the scope of shareholder governance
rights. Empirical research by van der Elst
(2011) also provides evidence in support of
this hypothesis.
In conclusion, one might say that from a reg-
ulatory perspective it is possible to increase the
SHAREHOLDER GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE
Andreas Cahn
Goethe University
Dominik Schöneberger 
Goethe Universityattendance rate by reducing the cost of partic-
ipating or by increasing the influence of the
shareholders.
Shareholder attendance in AGMs does not
only vary from country to country but also
over time. The available data show a slight
increase in shareholder participation during
the period from 2006 to 2011. While the aver-
age presence was about 54 per cent in 2006 it
went up to almost 60 per cent in 2011 (see
Figure 1). This growth was all but smooth in
different countries. The Netherlands, for
example, had an average voting turnout of 43
per cent in 2006 which increased up to 63 per
cent in 2011, while shareholder attendance in
Spain grew by less than 3 per cent during the
same period. The causes for these significant
differences are still unexplained. A possible
reason for the increase in shareholder atten-
dance may be recent EU legislation on share-
holder governance rights.
RECENT REGULATORY CHANGES
In July 2007 the European Union issued
Directive 2007/36/EC on the exercise of cer-
tain shareholder rights in listed companies
which was implemented in Germany by the
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Aktionärs  rechte  -
richtlinie (ARUG) in 2009. The main purpose
of the Directive is to facilitate the exercise of
shareholder governance rights by reducing the
costs of participation in an AGM. In order to
achieve a higher degree of shareholder parti  ci  -
pation in corporate governance, the Directive
requires a number of amendments to national
company laws: First, companies have to make
documents for the AGM available on their
website and to publish this information via
media which are accessible throughout the
community. Second, the use of depository vot-
ing rights is simplified and deregulated. Third,
companies may offer shareholders the oppor-
tunity to participate in the AGM without being
physically present. This is possible via an
online absentee ballot or online participation.
The absentee ballot is a mechanism for casting
votes, either before or during the general
meeting, that removes the necessity to appoint
a proxy holder who is physically present at the
meeting. Online participation enables share-
holders to address the general meeting from a
remote location through a real-time commu-
nication. In Germany, the majority of DAX
companies offered the online absentee ballot
in 2011 but only two also offered the possibil-
ity of online participation. It remains to be
seen whether this way of attending an AGM
will become more popular.
While all of the measures required by the
Directive decrease the cost of participating in
the AGM and therefore lead to an increased
shareholder turnout, somewhat surprisingly,
the turnout at the AGMs of companies listed in
Germany’s DAX 30 stock index has decreased
slightly since the new rules have been in place.
It is, however, still too early to predict whether
the new governance provisions will have no
positive impact in the future.
CONSEQUENCES FOR FUTURE REGULATION
Changes in voting turnouts for AGMs may
warrant adjustments of the statutory thresh-
olds for takeovers. If, for example, sharehold-
er participation decreased and the 30 per cent
threshold remained unchanged, investors
could regularly control listed companies with-
out being required to submit a mandatory
offer. As a result, the intended protection of
minority shareholders would be eroded by
changes in AGM attendance patterns. If, on
the other hand, participation increased as a
result of the Shareholder Rights Directive,
investors could be required to make mandato-
ry offers to shareholders of companies over
which they have no effective control. That
would, in turn, reduce the incentive for strate-
gic investors to buy larger shares of listed com-
panies and would thus be economically ineffi-
cient. Given the different average voting
turnouts within the EU, legislators might also
consider whether the current uniform control
threshold of 30 per cent is appropriate for all
Member States or whether the threshold
should be adjusted to the AGM attendance
patterns of different countries or even custom
tailored to the voting turnouts of individual
companies.
REFERENCES
Van der Elst, C. (2011)
“Revisiting shareholder activism at AGMs: Voting
determinants of large and small shareholders”,
ECGI – Finance Working Paper No. 311/2011
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he economic crisis in Greece is not a
simple consequence of the recent
global financial crisis, but is due to deep
structural problems of the Greek econo-
my that have accumulated over decades.
Consequently, the solution to the crisis is
also long-term, and consists in a series of
structural reforms that will take years.
The goal of these reforms is to raise pro-
ductivity, both in the private and in the
public sector.
The momentary rapid drop of incomes of
Greek households will need to be stopped by a
significant increase in productivity, if Greece is
to maintain its status as a relatively rich coun-
try (29th world-wide in terms of GDP per capi-
ta in 2010). The necessary reforms are at the
micro-economic level and concern basic insti-
tutions in the economy. We would like to
emphasize three key reform areas: (1) market
liberalization and regulatory bodies, (2) the
justice system and (3) productivity-based
incentives in the public sector. The memoran-
dum that Greece signed with the ECB/EU/IMF
“troika” in May 2010 emphasizes market liber-
alization, but much less the other two areas.
Moreover, the memorandum’s provisions on
market liberalization concern mainly labor
and product markets, and there is little
emphasis on financial reforms. We believe,
however, that in the absence of deep reforms
in all of the above areas, Greece will not exit
the crisis, and the austerity measures imple-
mented so far will not bear fruit. 
Indeed, while austerity measures are a neces-
sary first step to bring Greece’s budget deficit
under control, they are also causing the econ-
omy to contract. This raises the ratio of debt to
GDP and brings Greece closer to bankruptcy.
Growth requires instead deep structural
reforms. The troika should catalyze these
reforms by providing pressure and technical
assistance. While such engagement is costly
and time-consuming, the alternative is much
costlier: Greece will experience a deep and pro-
longed recession as well as significant social
unrest, and the huge sums lent to it will be lost.
MARKET LIBERALIZATION AND REGULATORY
BODIES
In 2008, Greece’s market for goods and servic-
es was the most heavily regulated in the
OECD. Its labor market was the fifth most
heavily regulated. To increase productivity in
the market for goods and services, all obstacles
to competition, such as minimum fees and
profit margins, and geographical restrictions to
exercise a profession, must be abolished. In
the labor market, firing costs must be reduced
and firm-level agreements facilitated. Effective
competition in the market for goods and serv-
ices also requires strong regulatory bodies.
Their independence from the state should be
strengthened, they should strive to implement
the law in a transparent and consistent man-
ner, and they should be subject to greater
accountability. 
One of the main causes of Greece’s current
recession is a credit crunch: Greek banks are
facing funding constraints due to the sover-
eign debt crisis, but also to bad choices, such as
the large credit expansion in an unstable
macro-economic environment and the invest-
ment of an overly large fraction of their port-
folio in Greek government bonds. The prob-
lem is due to a large extent to the close rela-
tionship between banks and the state – any
given government controls directly or indirect-
ly a large fraction of the banking sector. The
banking system needs to be truly independent
of the government. Entry by foreign strategic
10
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GETTING GREECE BACK ON TRACK: HOW?
Michael Haliassos  
Goethe University
Dimitri Vayanos  
London School of Economicsinvestors in some banks, at least on a tempo-
rary basis, could be useful in that respect. 
REFORMS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Reforms of the justice system are among the
most powerful growth-promoting reforms that
could be undertaken in Greece over the next
years. According to the World Bank’s 2011
Doing Business Report, Greece ranked 151st
among 183 countries for the time it takes to
try a civil case and 154th as to the quality and
enforcement of the laws concerning investor
protection. Under these conditions, Greece
will be unable to attract foreign investment,
even if it adopts the “fast-track” methods that
have been discussed recently. And it will not
be able to reduce corruption, which according
to Transparency International is highest in
Greece among all 27 EU countries.
Improving the justice system requires reforms
on many fronts. For example, the discretion of
judges to grant postponements must be limit-
ed. Also, the Greek state should comply
instantly with courts’ decisions. Courts should
be computerized. And finally, the performance
of each court should be measured and com-
pared to that of other courts. 
PRODUCTIVITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
The public sector needs to be transformed
from an institution hiring party-supporters in
exchange for votes, to an engine of growth
and an efficient provider of services to the
Greek economy and society. Much of current
public debate focuses on the need for spending
cuts. Repeated uniform wage cuts will, how-
ever, discourage and ultimately push away the
most dynamic public employees. We must
complement the discouraging message of
wage reductions with a positive perspective,
by making promotions and wage increases for
specific civil servants possible, but strictly
linked to productivity. The linking of financial
rewards to efficiency should be extended to
public bodies and agencies. Funding of public
institutions should be related to quantity but
especially quality of their output, using as
benchmarks relevant international indices and
best practices.
We believe that these fundamental structural
reforms will fall on fruitful ground. Unlike
their government, Greek households are not
heavily indebted and have been prudent in the
management of their own assets. A drastic
reform of the economy that creates incentives
for investment and entrepreneurship will
allow the Greek people to apply their energy
and resources to getting Greece back on a
track of rapid growth.
The full article is available at: 
http://www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/images/
policy_platform/Greece_Reforms.pdf
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“Reforms or Bankruptcy”,
Policy Letter, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Böcking, H.-J. and Gros, M. (2011)
“Comment on the European Commission's
Green Paper ‘The EU corporate governance
framework”,
Policy Letter, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Issing, O. (2011)
“Slithering to the wrong kind of union”,
Policy Letter, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Krahnen, J. (2011)
“The bail-in puzzle”,
Policy Letter, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Krahnen, J. (2011)
“Politiker wollen die Wahrheit nicht hören”,
Policy Letter, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Schmidt, R. (2011)
“Ratingagenturen entmachten – aber wie?",
Policy Letter, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Wieland, V. (2011)
“Der Euro befindet sich nicht in einer Krise”,
Policy Letter, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt12
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LONGEVITY RISK AND CAPITAL MARKETS SOLUTIONS
Raimond Maurer, Chair of Investment,
Portfolio Management and Pension
Finance at the House of Finance, co-
organized this year’s International
Longevity Risk and Capital Markets
Solutions Conference together with
Assistant Professor Ralph Rogalla. This
conference, which took place between
September 8 and 9, was held at the
House of Finance.
A two-day conference on longevity risk –
what makes this topic so important?
Longevity risks are of considerable impor-
tance for all institutions that offer fully-fund-
ed pension finance products, e. g. pension
funds or insurance companies. These have to
calculate product prices that correlate with
their clients’ life spans. Miscalculation has
serious implications: whoever sets the
longevity risk too low gets into trouble at the
payment stage, whereas too high an estimate
results in expensive and thus unattractive
products. These calculation difficulties have
only become apparent in the last ten years,
with more and more products reaching the
payment stage. At the same time, pension
schemes have shifted away from shared
financing towards fully-funded models. In
the past, longevity risk was treated by adjust-
ing the pension contribution. Today, you
have to internalize the risk individually.
Isn’t it possible to hedge against longevity
risks by reinsuring or securitizing?
There has been demand for appropriate rein-
surance for quite some time now. But rein-
surance companies are increasingly less will-
ing to take on such risk – or will charge dear-
ly in order to do so – because they are begin-
ning to see the difficulties inherent in
longevity risk calculation. That’s why the
institutions in question now try to transfer
longevity risks to the capital market, making
these of more interest to stock exchanges and
investment companies as well.
What assets are now available for hedging
against longevity risk?
One example is fixed-interest securities for
which the coupon is linked to the mortality
rate: an increase in the latter would lead to
higher coupon payments. Derivatives offer
another possibility: a pension fund, for exam-
ple, transfers part of a portfolio to an invest-
ment company which, in turn, releases this
as a security on the capital market by means
of a special purpose vehicle. Deutsche Börse
is now developing a mortality index that
reflects realized mortalities and which might
serve as a base for different assets and deriv-
atives. But capital volumes in this market are
still low, so we are at an early stage in this
process.
What research questions are now most 
pertinent?
Researchers deal with three major questions: 
1) How can we model mortality? What sort
of models are capable of depicting such a
long-term process that can only be gauged
infrequently (at best, yearly data are avail-
able) and of predicting today the likely
mortality rates for the next thirty or forty
years to come? 
2)  How can you derive risks and, hence,
product prices from such modeling? 
3) How does the consideration of these risks
influence demand – do products become
more attractive compared with other
investment products? Our aim is that at
some point in the future we will be able to
make investment recommendations that
are based on sound research.
Raimond Maurer  
Goethe University
Ralph Rogalla  
Goethe University13
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SELECTED HOUSE OF FINANCE PUBLICATIONS
Baums, T. (2011) 
Das preußische Schuldverschreibungsgesetz und
F. C. von Savigny”,  
Bechtold, S. et al. (Eds.), Recht, Ordnung und
Wett  bewerb, pp. 1097-1118
Branger, N., Schlag, C., Wu, L. (2011) 
“Pricing Two Heterogeneous Trees”,  
forthcoming in Journal of Financial and Quan  -
titative Analysis
Christelis, D., Georgarakos, D., 
Haliassos, M. (2011) 
“Differences in Portfolios Across Countries:
Eco  nomic Environment versus Household
Cha  rac  teristics”,  
forthcoming in Review of Economics and
Sta  tistics 
Cwik, T., Müller, G. J., Wolters, M. H.
(2011) 
“Does trade integration alter monetary policy
transmission?”,  
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Vol. 54, Issue 4, pp. 545-564
Haar, B. (2011) 
“Die Rolle der Ratingagenturen bei der Cor  -
porate Governance von Banken”, 
Hopt, K. J., Wohlmannstetter, G. (Eds.), Hand  -
buch Corporate Governance von Banken,
München 2011, pp. 223-243
Heider, F., Inderst, R. (2011) 
“Loan Prospecting”,  
forthcoming in Review of Financial Studies
Höring, D., Gruendl, H. (2011) 
“Investigating Risk Disclosure Practices in the
European Insurance Industry”,  
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance,
Vol. 36, Issue 3, pp. 380-413 
Issing, O. (2011) 
“Lessons for Monetary Policy: What Should
the Consensus Be?”,  
International Monetary Fund, Working Paper
No 11/97
Kühn, C. (2011) 
“Nonlinear stochastic integration with a non-
smooth family of integrators”,  
forthcoming in Stochastics
Laubach, T. (2011) 
“Fiscal Policy and Interest Rates: The Role of
Sovereign Default Risk”,  
NBER International Seminar on Macro  eco  no  -
mics 2010, pp. 7-29
Lwowski, H.-J., Fischer, G., 
Langenbucher, K. (Eds., 2011) 
“Das Recht der Kreditsicherung”,  
9
th, completely reworked and substantially
extended edition, Erich Schmidt Verlag
Maurer, R., Rogalla, R., Shen, S. (2011) 
“The Liquidity Crisis of German Open-end
Real Estate Funds and their Impact on Optimal
Asset Allocation in Retirement”,  
forthcoming in Zeitschrift für Betriebs  wirt  schaft
Rauch, C. (2011) 
“Bank M&A – A Market Power Story?”,  
Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 35, 
pp. 2341-2354
Wandt, M., Sehrbrock, D. (2011) 
“Gedanken zu den Solvency-II-Richtlinien  -
zielen und ihre Bedeutung für das VAG”,  
Burgard, U. et al. (Eds.), Festschrift für Uwe H.
Schneider, pp. 1395-1405 
Wiesel, T., Skiera, B., Villanueva, J. (2011) 
“Customer Lifetime and Customer Equity
Models for External Using Company-Reported
Summary Data”,  
Journal of Interactive Marketing, Vol. 25,
Issue 1, 20-22
Zickert, F., Beck, R. (2011) 
“Coping with Existing Systems in Information
Systems Development – Analysis of Three
Software Development Projects of a Financial
Institution”,  
forthcoming in IEEE Transactions on Software
EngineeringRESEARCH GRANTS FOR HOUSE
OF FINANCE SCHOLARS
A research project of Volker
Wieland, Professor for Mo  -
netary Theory and Policy at
the House of Finance, will be
funded by the Deutsche For  -
schungs  ge  mein  schaft (DFG).
This project − “Recursive esti-
mation, forecasting and learning in dynamic
macroeconomic models, including general
equilibrium models with microeconomic
foun  dations” − is conducted together with
Sergey Slobodyan from the Center for 
Eco  no  mic Research and Graduate Education
(CERGE) at Charles University in Prague and
aims to overcome the traditional assumption
of rational expectations by modeling the
learning behavior of market participants and
investigating its consequences for forecasting
business cycles.
Grigory Vilkov, Assistant Pro  -
fessor of Derivatives at the
House of Finance, has ob    tai  -
ned funding from the Fon  da  -
tion Banque de France for
the project “Com  pa  ring Diffe  -
rent Re  gu  latory Mea  sures to
Con  trol Stock Market Volatility: A General
Equili  brium Analysis”. Co-researchers are
Bernard Dumas (INSEAD), Raman Uppal
(EDHEC) and Adrian Buss (a PhD student at
Goethe University).
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OTMAR ISSING AWARDED
GUSTAV STOLPER PRIZE
Otmar Issing, President of the
Center for Financial Studies
and the Board of Trustees for
the House of Finance, was
awarded the Gustav Stolper
Preis on September 6, during
the annual meeting of the
Verein für Socialpolitik (VfS). This year’s con-
gress of the premier association of German
speaking economists was held at the House of
Finance and in other locations at the Westend
campus of Goethe University. 
Issing, previously Chief Economist and Member
of the Executive Board of the European Central
Bank (ECB), was honored for being an excel-
lent scientist who has influenced the public dis-
cussion on economic issues. His dissemination
of economic insights has contributed signifi-
cantly to an understanding of real-world eco-
nomic problems and the solutions that these
may require. “Otmar Issing conveys economic
and monetary issues in a clear, well-balanced,
and convincing way”, said VfS Chairman
Michael C. Burda. “Thanks to Issing, the ECB
now has an outstanding research department”,
he elaborated. Issing, who celebrated his 75
th
birthday in March, admonished the economists
present to avoid thoughtless comments on cur-
rent events without considering the conse-
quences. They should be aware of the fact that
their words carried weight.
NICOLA FUCHS-SCHÜNDELN TO
ADVISE GERMANY’S FINANCE
MINISTER 
Wolfgang Schäuble now has
a second advisor from the
House of Finance – making it
three from Goethe University
as a whole. Following Alfons
Wei  chenrieder and Jan Pieter
Krah  nen, Nicola Fuchs-Schün  -
  deln has been appointed a member of the Scien-
tific Advisory Committee of Germany’s Federal
Ministry of Finance. Fuchs-Schündeln has held
the Chair of Macroeconomics and Development
at the House of Finance since 2009, and is also
Principal Investigator of Goethe University’s
Cluster of Excellence “Normative Orders”. Prior
to this, she conducted research at the universi-
ties of Yale and Harvard. Her research focuses on
consumption and savings of private households,
endogenous preferences, and the transformation
of East Germany. Last year, she received the
highly coveted ERC Starting Grant from the
European Research Council.
STEFAN GERLACH NOW DEPUTY
GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL
BANK OF IRELAND
A loss but also an honor for
the Institute for Monetary and
Finan  cial Stability (IMFS) and
the House of Finance: on Sep  -
tember 1, Stefan Ger  lach,
formerly Professor of Mo  ne  -
tary Economics at the House
of Finance and Executive Director of the
IMFS, started his new job as Deputy Governor
of the Central Bank of Ireland. He is now one
of two deputy governors at the central bank
and is responsible for central banking func-
tions. Before coming to Goethe University in
September 2007, Gerlach, a Swedish national,
worked at the Bank of International Settle  -
ments in Basel, most recently as Head of Secre  -
ta  riat of the Committee on the Global Financial
System. He has also served as head of research
at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and as
executive director of the Hong Kong Institute
for Monetary Research.
AXEL WEBER A SENIOR FELLOW AT THE CFS
Axel A. Weber, the former President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, has accepted an invitation to
become a Senior Fellow at the Center for Financial Studies (CFS). Weber is currently a Visiting
Professor at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. He is to be nominated for elec-
tion to the Board of Directors of the Swiss bank UBS in 2012 and is expected to become the
bank’s Chairman in 2013. Weber has had a long-standing affiliation with the CFS. From 1998 to
2002, he was a Director of the Center and Professor for Monetary Economics at Goethe
University. After that he remained an active member of the CFS Board of Trustees. Weber is also
a member of the Board of Trustees for the House of Finance.15
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QUARTERLY EVENT CALENDAR
DECEMBER
Monday, 5
th EFL Jour Fixe
5 pm “An Analysis of the Financial
Performance of Radical, Complex and
Financially Risky Innovations”
Speaker: Lisa Schöler
Tuesday, 6
th Finance Seminar 
5.15 pm Speaker: Prof. Johan Walden, Ph.D., 
Haas School of Business, 
University of Californiy Berkeley
Tuesday, 13
th Finance Seminar 
5.15 pm Speaker: Prof. Jörg Rocholl, Ph.D., 
European School of Management and
Technology (ESMT)
Tuesday, 13
th CFS Colloquium 
5.30 pm “Die Europäische Währungsunion –
Politische Union durch die Hintertür
fiskalischer Tranfers?”
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Otmar Issing, 
Center for Financial Studies
Friday, 16
th ILF Symposion 
9 am Wirtschaftsstrafrecht
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Andreas Cahn, 
Prof. Dr. Klaus Lüderssen
Please refer to www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/eventlist.html
for continuous updates of the event calendar.
Please note that for some events registration is compulsory.
OCTOBER
Monday, 10
th EFL Jour Fixe 
5 pm “The Cost of Being Slow in Times of
High Frequency Trading”
Speaker: Moritz Christian Weber
Thursday, 20
th ILF Conference
9.30 am – 5.30 pm  “Regulating the Alternative
Investment Fund Industry”
Thursday, 27
th ILF Conference
9.30 am – 5.30 pm  “Collective Action Clauses and the
Restructuring of Sovereign Debt”
Thursday, 27
th HoF Brown Bag Seminar 
12 pm “Familiarity and Financial Behaviour”
Speaker: Prof. Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln, Ph.D.
NOVEMBER
Saturday, 5
th Goethe Business School  
Graduation  
Full-Time MBA, Class of 2011
Monday, 7
th EFL Jour Fixe  
5 pm “An Analysis of Side Effects 
of Anonymity in the Internet of
Services”
Speaker: Ulrich Lampe
Wednesday, 9
th CFS Colloquium 
5.30 pm “Europa als Emittent: 
Die neue Finanzierungsgesellschaft 
(Umsetzung des Rettungsschirms)”
Speaker: Klaus Regling, 
European Financial Stability Facility
Friday, 18
th –  4
th Symposion 
Saturday, 19
th “Economy, Criminal Law, Ethics”
9 am (ECLE)
“Unternehmensstrafrecht”
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Andreas Cahn, 
Prof. Dr. Klaus Lüderssen
Tuesday, 22
th Finance Seminar
5.15 pm Speaker: Jack Favilukis, Ph.D.,  
London School of Economics
Thursday, 24
th HoF Brown Bag Seminar
12 pm Speaker: Prof. Dr. Isabel Feichtner
Tuesday, 29
th Finance Seminar
5.15 pm Speaker: Prof. Álvaro Cartea, Ph.D., 
Carlos III University of Madrid&
Address:
House of Finance
Goethe University Frankfurt
Grüneburgplatz 1
D-60323 Frankfurt am Main
Contact Person:
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang König
Tel. +49 (0)69 798 34000
Fax +49 (0)69 33910
E-Mail: info@hof.uni-frankfurt.de
Internet: www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de